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ABSTRACT
The present complexity in designing web applications makes soft-
ware security a difficult goal to achieve. An attacker can explore
a deployed service on the web and attack at his/her own leisure.
Moving Target Defense (MTD) in web applications is an effective
mechanism to nullify this advantage of their reconnaissance but the
framework demands a good switching strategy when switching be-
tween multiple configurations for its web-stack. To address this is-
sue, we propose modeling of a real-world MTD web application
as a repeated Bayesian game. We then formulate an optimization
problem that generates an effective switching strategy while con-
sidering the cost of switching between different web-stack config-
urations. To incorporate this model into a developed MTD system,
we develop an automated system for generating attack sets of Com-
mon Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) for input attacker types
with predefined capabilities. Our framework obtains realistic re-
ward values for the players (defenders and attackers) in this game
by using security domain expertise on CVEs obtained from the Na-
tional Vulnerability Database (NVD). We also address the issue of
prioritizing vulnerabilities that when fixed, improves the security
of the MTD system. Lastly, we demonstrate the robustness of our
proposed model by evaluating its performance when there is uncer-
tainty about input attacker information.
1. INTRODUCTION
Present day web applications are widely used by businesses to
provide services over the Internet. Oftentimes, sensitive business
and user data are managed by these applications. Vulnerabilities in
these web applications pose serious threats to the confidentiality
and integrity of both businesses and users [16].
There exist numerous static (white-box) and dynamic (black-
box) analysis tools for identifying vulnerabilities in a system [2,
6]. These have become less effective in present times due to the
increasing complexity of web applications, their dependency on
downstream technologies, and the limited development and deploy-
ment time [22]. Worse yet, the attackers, with time on their side,
can perform reconnaissance and attack. To address this challenge,
we consider a Moving Target Defense (MTD) based approach [4],
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which complements the existing vulnerability analysis techniques
through a defense-in-depth mechanism.
The MTD based approach dynamically shifts a system over time
to increase the uncertainty and complexity for the attackers to per-
form probing and attacking [24], while ensuring that the system
is available for legitimate users. As the window of attack oppor-
tunities decreases, the effort in finding and successfully executing
an attack increases. Moreover, if an attacker succeeds in finding a
vulnerability at one point in time, it may not be exploitable at an-
other time because of the moving defense system, making the web
application more resilient [18].
Various aspects that support Moving Target Defense approach
such as, using multiple implementation languages, multiple database
instances with synchronization, etc. are considered in different lay-
ers of web application architecture, along with ways to switch be-
tween them. However, the design of good quality switching strate-
gies itself is left as an open problem. This is key to effectively lever-
age various move options—thereby maximizing the complexity for
the attacker and minimizing the damage for the defender.
Our aim in this paper is to design effective switching policies for
movement in the MTD system that maximize the security of the
web application, given the set of components and configurations
of the system which can be “moved around”, while simultaneously
considering realistic costs for “moving them around”. In web ap-
plications, the defender (leader) deploys a system up-front. The at-
tacker observes (or follows) the system over time before choosing
an attack. These characteristics motivate us to formulate the MTD
system as a repeated Bayesian Stackelberg Game (BSG). For this
formulation to be meaningful in real-world applications, we use
real world attack data for our model. We propose a framework to
define attacker types for our game and automatically generate at-
tack options for each of them by mining and characterizing Com-
mon Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs). We develop a system
that leverages the knowledge in public attack databases and exper-
tise of system administrators for obtaining meaningful game utili-
ties and switching costs respectively.
For computing the movement policy for the defender, we initially
expected to be able to use existing solvers developed for physical
security systems [17]. Unfortunately, none of them considered the
cost of switching between strategies. Since this is highly relevant in
cyber-security systems, we had to formulate an optimization prob-
lem to consider these costs when generating strategies.
The increased complexity in an MTD systems exacerbates the
difficulty of prioritizing vulnerabilities that need to be fixed next.
We define this problem formally and propose a preliminary solu-
tion. Lastly, we talk about metrics to measure the robustness of
switching strategies generated by various models when the uncer-
tainty about attacker types vary in the real world.
In section 2, we introduce the reader to the different ways people
have tried to address the problem of generating switching strate-
gies for cyber-security systems. We introduce domain terminology
related to MTD systems for web-applications in section 3. In sec-
tion 4, we develop the Bayesian Game model for this system defin-
ing attacker types, attack classification, rewards generated from se-
curity databases and strategy switching costs. To find an effective
switching strategy, we propose a solver that maximizes system se-
curity while accounting for switching costs in section 5. We em-
pirically study the effectiveness and robustness of the strategy gen-
erated by our framework in section 6, comparing it to the state-
of-the-art. We also formulate the problem of identifying critical
vulnerabilities and propose a preliminary solution in section 6. We
conclude the paper in section 7, highlighting promising research
directions.
2. RELATED WORK
Although there exists prior work on the design of switching strate-
gies for MTD systems, most of it is domain specific. Evaluation of
these strategies on real-world MTD systems for web applications
is scarce. We discuss some of these works, highlighting their limi-
tations in the domain of web applications, thus motivating the need
for our solution. Existing efforts describe the use of randomized
switching strategies, and show its effectiveness for MTD systems
[24]. We empirically demonstrate that our strategy outperforms this
state-of-the-art for web applications, especially when the cost of
switching is negligible.
Attacker-defender scenarios have been modeled earlier as stochas-
tic games for attack-surface shifting [9]. Other works model the
MTD problem as a repeated game where the defender uses uniform
random strategy with the exception that the same defense config-
uration is not deployed in two consecutive rounds [23]. This work
needs an in-depth analysis of code, which is unrealistic for complex
web applications.
Switching strategies for MTD systems based on detection of probes
by attackers are presented by [15]. Unfortunately, an accurate de-
tection of attacks in web applications is difficult, if not impossible.
Furthermore, such strategies can lead to a detrimental performance
in repeated games if an intelligent attacker biases the system to
switch more towards MTD configurations where the attacker at-
tains higher reward. In [8], the MTD system is modeled as a game
called PLADD, based on FlipIt games [19]. This work assumes
that different agents control the server in different game rounds,
which is impractical for most cyber-seccurity applications, essen-
tially web applications. These techniques also fail to capture the
reconnaissance aspect of the attackers which is shown to be an im-
portant aspect in the attack phase [12].
In [3], a game theoretic leader-follower type approach is pre-
sented for a dynamic platform defense where the strategies are cho-
sen so as to be diverse, based on statistical analysis rather than
being uniformly distributed. They find similarity among different
configurations of the MTD system, which is difficult in the domain
of web applications. The work fails to consider the uncertainty in
the attacker model and the costs for switching.
These aspects of uncertainty in the attacker model and attacker
reconnaissance are handled effectively via Bayesian Stackelberg
Games (BSG), making it an appropriate choice for modeling the
web applications domain. Our modeling could help us leverage the
existing solution methods in the physical security domains [17]
and provide scalable and optimal switching strategies for cyber-
security systems. Unfortunately, these works, to our knowledge, do
not consider the cost the defenders incur when asked to switch from
a particular strategy to another. Hence, we propose a solver that
maximizes the defender’s reward and minimizes the overall cost
of switching between web-application configurations. Our solver
is essentially an extension of the DOBSS solver [13]. Although
there has been furhter development since DOBSS, the more re-
cent solvers for BSGs make additional assumptions about the game
structure—either about the action sets of the defender, or the pres-
ence of hierarchical structure among attacker types [1], which do
not hold for the web application domain.
The use of Common Vulnerabilitiy Scoring System (CVSS) for
rating attacks is well studied in security [7]. We describe this met-
ric later. CVSS provides a strong backbone for obtaining utilities
for our game theoretic model. None of the existing works (to our
knowledge) talk about the pragmatic aspect of prioritizing vulner-
abilites in MTD systems. Also, there does not seem to be any stan-
dard metrics to capture the robustness of strategies generated by a
model. We address both these issues in the upcoming sections.
3. MOVING TARGET DEFENSE FOR WEB
APPLICATIONS
In this section, we present a brief overview of the web applica-
tion domain and its functionality which will be useful for under-
standing the challenges involved in generating solution strategies.
3.1 Configuration
A configuration set for a web application stack is denoted asC =
C1×C2 · · ·×Cn where there are n-technological stacks. Here, Ci
denotes the set of technologies that can be used in the i-th layer
of the application stack. A valid configuration c is an n-tuple that
preserves the system’s operational goals.
Consider a web application that has two layers (n = 2) where
the first layer denotes the coding language the web-application was
coded in and the second layer denotes the database that stores the
data handled by this application. Say, the technologies used in each
layer areC1 = {Python, PHP} andC2 = {MySQL, postgreSQL}.
A valid configuration can be (PHP, MySQL). The diversity of an
MTD system, which is the number of valid configurations, can be
4 (at max) in this case.
3.2 Attack
Software security is defined in terms of three characteristics -
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability [10]. In a broad sense, an
attack on a web application is defined as an act that compromises
any of the aforementioned characteristics. The National Vulnerabil-
ity Database (NVD) is a public directory of known vulnerabilities
and exposures affecting all technologies that can be used in a web
application. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exploits (CVEs) in
this database list vulnerabilities and corresponding attacks that can
be used to compromise an application using the affected technol-
ogy. As each CVE has an exploit associated with it, we use the
terms vulnerability and attack interchangeably going forward.
3.3 Switching Strategy
This is a decision making process for the defender to select the
next valid system configuration c′ given c as the present system
configuration (where both c, c′ ∈ C). If pc represents the probabil-
ity that c is chosen in a given deployment cycle through randomiza-
tion, a switching strategy is f : C → pc where ∑
c∈C
pc = 1 ∀ pc ∈
[0, 1]. To add to the complexity, the cost for switching from a con-
figuration c to another configuration c′ can be nontrivial and non-
uniform. Thus, the aim of a good strategy is to maximize the effec-
tiveness of an MTD system while trying to minimize the cost for
switching. Present state-of-the-art MTD system for web applica-
tions use a uniformly distributed switching strategy (pc = 1/|C|)
and assume that switching between configurations incur a uniform
cost [18].
We now develop a game theoretic system to generate switch-
ing strategies for the MTD web application that 1) shows a uni-
formly distributed switching strategy is sub-optimal and 2) consid-
ers the non-negative non-uniform costs of switching between dif-
ferent configurations of an MTD system.
4. GAME THEORETIC MODELING
In this section, we model the setup of MTD systems in as a re-
peated step Bayesian Game.
4.1 Agents and Agent types
There are (N =) two players in our game, a defender and an at-
tacker. The set θi is the set of types for player i (= {1, 2}). Thus, θ1
and θ2 denotes the set of defender and attacker types respectively.
The j−th attacker type is represented by θ2j .
When an attacker attacks an application, its beliefs about what
(resource/data) is most valuable to the application owner (defender)
remains consistent. Thus, we assume that the attacker knows that
there is only one type of defender when (s)he attacks a particular
web application. Thus, we have |θ1| = 1.
We consider finite types of attackers. Each attacker type is de-
fined in our model using a 3 tuple,
θ2i = 〈name, {(expertise, technologies) . . . }, probability〉
where the second field is a set of two dimentional values that ex-
press an attacker’s expertise (∈ [0, 10]) in a technology. The ratio-
nale for using values in this range stems from the use of Common
Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) described later. Lastly, the
set of attacker types have a discrete probability distribution associ-
ated with it. The probability Pθ2j represents the defender’s belief
about the attacker type θ2j attacking their application. Obviously,
the probability values of all attacker types sum up to one.∑
θ2j∈θ2
Pθ2j = 1
Note that one can define attacker expertise over a ‘category of at-
tacks’ (like ‘BufferOverflowAttacks’) instead of technology specific
attacks. We feel the latter is more realistic for our domain. This def-
inition captures the aspect that an attacker type can have expertise
in a set of technologies. Since, these attacker types and the proba-
bility distribution over them are application specific, it is defined by
a domain expert and taken as an input to our proposed model. For
instance, a defender using a no-SQL database in all configurations
of his MTD system, assigns zero probability to an ‘SQL_database’
attacker type because none of their attacks can compromise the se-
curity of his present system.
The assumption that the input probability distribution over all
the attacker types can be accurately specified is a strong one. We
later discuss how errors in judgment can affect the effectiveness of
a switching strategy and define a measure to capture the robustness
of the generated policy in such circumstances.
4.2 Agent actions
We define Aθi as a finite set of actions available to player i. The
defender action set, Aθ1 is a switch action to a valid configuration,
c of the web application. The maximum number of actions (or pure
strategies) for the defender can ideally be |C1| × |C2| · · · × |Cn|.
This might be lower since a technology used in layer x might not
be compatible when paired with a technology used in layer y ( 6= x)
rendering that configuration invalid.
For the attacker, Aθ2 represents the set of all attacks used by
atleast one attacker type. A particular attack a belongs to the set
Aθ2 if it affects atleast one of the technologies used in the layers
for our web application (C1 ∪ C2 · · · ∪ Cn).
We now define a function f : (θ2t, a) → {1, 0} for our model.
The function implies an attack a is a part of the attacker type θ2t’s
arsenal Aθ2t(⊆ Aθ2) if the value of the function is 1. This func-
tion value is based on the similarity between (i) the expertise of the
attacker type contrasted with the ‘exploitability’ necessary to exe-
cute the attack, and (ii) the attacker’s expertise in the technology for
which the attack can be used. We provide a concrete definition for
the function f after elaborating on what we mean by exploitability
of an attack.
For (almost all) CVEs listed in the NVD database, we have a six-
dimensional CVSS v2 vector representing two independent scores
– Impact Score (IS) and Exploitability Score (ES). For an attack ac-
tion a, ESa (∈ [0, 10]) represents the ease of exploitability (higher
is tougher). For each attack, the database also lists a set of tech-
nologies it affects, say T a.
Let us consider the set of technologies an attacker type t has
expertise in is Tt. Now we define the function f as,
f(θ2t, a) =
{
1, iff Tt ∩ T a 6= φ ∧ ESa ≤ expertiset
0 otherwise
4.3 Reward values for the Game
Now that we have attack sets for each attacker type, the general
reward structure for the proposed game is defined as follows:
RAa,θ2i,c =
 +xa if a ⊂ υ(c)−ya if a can be detected or a ⊂ c′0 otherwise
RDa,θ2i,c =
 −xd if a ⊂ υ(c)+yd if a can be detected or a ⊂ c′
0 otherwise
where RAa,θ2i,c and R
D
a,θ2i,c
are the rewards for the attacker type
and the defender respectively, when the attacker type θ2i uses an
attack action a against a configuration c (∈ C). The function υ(c)
represents the set of security vulnerabilities (CVEs) that configura-
tion c has. Also, c′ refers to a honey-net configuration. A honey-net
is a configuration setup with intentional vulnerabilities to invite at-
tackers for catching (or observing) them.
Note that the reward values when a attacker does not attack (NO-
OP action), is zero. Moreover, a defender gets zero reward for suc-
cessfully defending a system. We reward him positively only if
he/she is able to reveal some more information or catch the attacker
without impacting operation requirements for the non-malicious
users (or using honey-nets). He gets a negative reward if an attacker
successfully exploits his(/her) system.
To obtain reward values for the variables xa, ya, xd and yd, we
make use of CVSSv2 metric. This metric provides the Impact (IS)
and Exploitability Scores (ES), stated above, which are combined
to calculate a third score called Base Score (BS) [11]. Using these,
we now define the following:
xd = −1 ∗ IS
xa = BS
Note that BS considers both the impact and the exploitability.
When the IS for two attacks are the same, the one that is easier
to exploit gets the attacker a higher reward value. The ease of an
attack can be interpreted in terms of the resource and effort spent
by an attacker for an attack Vs. the reward (s)he attains by harming
the defender. Although the robustness of our framework provides
provisions for having yd and ya, detecting attacks on a deployed
system or setting up honey-nets is still in its nascent stages. Hence,
there are no actions where values of yd or ya are required in our
present application.
Before we move on, we describe briefly what security dimen-
sions the independent scores (IS and ES) are actually trying to cap-
ture in the context of a real world software system. For this purpose,
we first define the 6 independent values that generate these scores.
• Access Vector (AV) is dependent on the amount of access an
attacker needs to exploit a vulnerability. Thus, an attack that
needs physical access to a system will have lower score than
one that can be exploited over the Internet by any machine.
• Access Complexity (AC) represents the complexity of ex-
ploiting an attack. A buffer overflow attack on an Internet
service is less complex than an e-mail client vulnerability in
which a user has perform attachment downloads followed by
executing it and hence has lower AC value.
• Authentication (Au) level required to execute the attack. For
example, if no sign-up account is required to exploit the sys-
tem, this value is high. In contrast, if one needs multiple ac-
counts to exploit the vulnerability, the value is low.
• Confidentiality Impact (C) scores are low if only some (non-
relevant) information gets leaked. Highest impact occurs when
say, the entire database is compromised if the vulnerability is
successfully exploited.
• Integrity Impact (I) refers to the attacker’s power to mod-
ify files or behaviour of a system if he executes the exploit
successfully. The more the power– say the attacker is able
to change code or remove arbitrary files in the system– the
higher this value.
• Availability Impact (A) represents the power of a successful
exploit to bring down the availability of a system. A success-
ful Denial of Service (DoS) that brings down an application
server, will have high impact.
From these values, one can obtain the two independent scores using
the following formulas,
ES = 20 ∗ (AV ) ∗ (AC) ∗ (Au)
IS = −10.41 ∗ (1− (1− C)(1− I)(1−A))
A rigorous treatment of assigning these values can be found in [11].
The CVSS values are generated by security experts across the globe
and the database is updated every single day.
Our model takes a time range as input. It then parses all the CVEs
(a) from the NVD in that time range to finally filter out the ones
that can affect atleast one of the configurations in our system (a ⊂
υ(ci)). Note that old CVEs are irrelevant for generating attack sets
for a relatively new MTD system as they either have no effect on the
updated versions of the technologies they can affect or have popular
solutions to prevent them while developing the application. For our
application, we obtain this input range from our security experts.
4.4 Switching Cost
The switching costs can be represented by aKn×n matrix where
the n rows (and columns) denote the n system configurations. The
cell Kij denotes the cost of switching when the defender moves
from configuration i to configuration j. As mentioned earlier, the
values in K are all non-negative. Our security experts, who have
written the code to automatically move from one configuration to
another, hand code these values in each cell of the martix. We pro-
vide some guidance in choosing these values here and give a con-
crete example on how we selected these for our application later.
If there is no common technology between configurations c and
c′ involved in a switch operation, the cost will be large. Also, switch-
ing technologies in a specific layer may incur more cost than switch-
ing technologies in other layers. In the developed MTD system, we
find that switching between databases incur large costs because the
structure of the data needs to be changed for shifting, and the time
required to copy huge amounts of data from one database to another
must also be accounted for.
The matrix K for our system turns out to be symmetric, i.e.
Kij = Kji ∀ i, j ∈ {1, . . . n}. Also, Kii = 0, which implies
that there is no cost if no configuration switch occurs. Note that
although our security experts think this is the structure of rewards
for the developed system, the modelling is generic enough to allow
for asymmetric costs. Lastly, we choose the values of Kij in the
range [0, 10]. The reason for this upper bound becomes clear in the
upcoming section.
5. SWITCHING STRATEGY GENERATION
In this section, we first introduce the notion of Stackelberg Equi-
librium for our security game, that gives us a defender strategy that
maximizes his reward (and thus the security of the system). We
briefly talk of optimization methods, relevant to our domain, that
can produce this. Finally, we incorporate the costs of switching into
the objective function and propose our solver.
5.1 Stackelberg Equilibrium
The strategy generated for the designed game needs to capture
the reconnaissance aspect. Note that the game starts only after the
defender has deployed the web application, acting as a leader. This
now becomes a repeated game in which an attacker can observe a fi-
nite number of switch moves and probabilistically learn the switch-
ing strategy (since |C|  ∞) of the defender. Thus, the defender
has to select a strategy that maximizes his reward in this game,
given that the attacker knows his strategy. This is exactly the prob-
lem of finding the Stackelberg Equilibrium in a Bayesian Game
[20]. The resulting mixed strategy is the switching strategy for the
defender in our MTD system. Unfortunately, this problem becomes
NP-hard in our case because of multiple attacker types [5].
Before we find a strong Stackelberg Equilibrium for our pro-
posed game, we state a couple of well founded assumptions we
make. Firstly, an attacker chooses a pure strategy, i.e., a single at-
tack action that maximizes his reward value. This assumption is
popular in prior work on security games because for every mixed
strategy for the attacker, there is always a pure strategy in support
for it [14]. Secondly, we assume that the pure strategy of an attacker
type is not influenced by the strategy of other attacker types. This
is not limiting for our web application domain since an attacker
type’s attack selection is independent of the attack action chosen
by another type.
To solve for the optimal mixed strategy, one can use the Decom-
posed Optimal Bayesian Stackelberg Solver (DOBSS) [13]. This
optimizes the expected reward of the defender over all possible
mixed strategies for the defender (~x), and pure strategies for each
attacker type (~nθ2i ) given the attacker type uncertainty (~Pθ2i ). We
now define the objective function of the Mixed Integer Quadratic
Program (MIQP) in Equation 1.
max
x,n,v
∑
c∈C
∑
θ2i∈θ2
∑
a∈Aθ2i
Pθ2iR
D
a,θ2i,c xcn
θ2i
a (1)
Notice that this does not consider that switching costs between de-
fender strategies. Essentially, this means the formulation assumes
that switching costs are uniform. Before we address this limitation
in the upcoming subsection, we take a little digression.
For our scenario, we have many attack actions. Thus, we ob-
serve that solving the MIQP version is more efficient (in computa-
tion time and memory usage) than solving the Mixed Integer Linear
Program (MILP) version of the DOBSS. This can be attributed to
the fact that the MILP formulation results in an increase in the di-
mensions of the solution space. Theoretically, the MIQP solves for
|C|+∑θ2i∈θ2∑aj∈Aθ2i |aj | variables where as the MILP solves
for |C| ∗∑θ2i∈θ2∑aj∈Aθ2i |aj | variables.
5.2 Incorporating Switching Costs
As defined in the last section, the cost for switching from a con-
figuration i to a configuration j can be represented as Kij . The
probability the system is in configuration i and then switches to
configuration j is xi · xj . Thus, the cost incurred by the defender
for a switch action from i to j is Kij · xi · xj . The expected cost
for any switch action is
∑
i∈C
∑
j∈C
Kij · xi · xj .
To account for cost, we can subtract this from the objective func-
tion of Equation 1 with a cost-accountability factor α (≥ 0) to
obtain
max
x,n,v
∑
c∈C
∑
θ2i∈θ2
∑
a∈Aθ2i
Pθ2iR
D
a,θ2i,c xcn
θ2i
a −α·
∑
i∈C
∑
j∈C
Kij ·xi·xj
Unfortunately, this results in a Bilinear Mixed Integer Program-
ming problem, which is not convex. To ameliorate this problem,
we now introduce new variables wij that essentially represent an
approximate value of xi · xj . We first use the piecewise linear Mc-
Cormick envelopes to design a convex function using these wij-
s that estimates a good solution to this problem [21]. Along with
these constrains, we introduce further constrains which we describe
after introducing the final MIQP convex optimization problem as
follows,
max
x,n,v
∑
c∈C
∑
θ2i∈θ2
∑
a∈Aθ2i
Pθ2iR
D
a,θ2i,c
xcn
θ2i
a − α ·
∑
i∈C
∑
j∈C
Kijwij
(2)
s.t.
∑
c∈C
xc = 1 (3)
∑
a∈Aθ2i
nθ2ia = 1 (4)
0 ≤ vθ2i −
∑
c∈C
RAa,θ2i,cxc ≤ (1− nθ2ia )M (5)
wij ≥ 0 ∀ i, j (6)
wij ≤ xi ∀ i, j (7)
wij ≤ xj ∀ i, j (8)∑
j∈C
∑
i∈C
wij = 1 ∀ i, j (9)∑
j∈C
wij = xi ∀ i (10)∑
i∈C
wij = xj ∀ j (11)
𝑐1 = {Python, MySQL}
𝑐1 = {Python, 
MySQL}
𝑐3 = {php, MySQL}
𝑐4 = {php, 
postgreSQL}
Automated Code 
converter
𝑐2 = {Python, 
postgreSQL}
?
Moving Target Defense
Web application
Figure 1: A moving target defense web application system
xc ∈ [0 . . . 1], nθ2ia ∈ {0, 1}, vθ2i ∈ R
∀ c ∈ C, θ2i ∈ θ2, a ∈ Aθ2i
where M is a large positive number. ~nθ2i and vθ2i give the pure
strategy and its corresponding reward for the attacker type θ2i re-
spectively, and ~x gives the mixed switching strategy for the de-
fender. (5) solves the dual problem of maximizing rewards for each
attacker type (vθ2i ) given the defender’s strategy. This ensures that
attackers always select the best attack action. The constrains (6), (7)
and (8) represent the McCormick envelope that provides lower and
upper bounds on eachwij . Since we consider all possible switches,∑
j∈C
∑
i∈C
xi · xj = 1. This is enforced by constrain (9). Lastly, for
each i,
∑
j∈C
xi ·xj = xi · (∑
j∈C
xj) = xi. This is represented by the
constrains (10) and (11).
If we now allow the maximum cost of switching to be 10, we can
see that the values for the cost is comparable in magnitude to the
value of the defenders rewards. This helps us to provide a semantic
meaning for the cost-accountability factor, α.
The first term in the objective function seeks to maximize the
defender’s reward, which in turn maximizes the security of the web
application. The second term on the other hand, seeks to reduce
the expected cost of the switching actions. Thus, α represents how
much importance is given to the cost of switching Vs. the level of
security desired. Consider the extreme cases, when α = 0, we are
producing the most secure strategy (which is the Stackelberg Equi-
librium) and considering switching between configurations incur
zero costs. This is the sub-set of solutions that are developed mostly
for physical security systems. In contrast to that, when α = 1, we
are saying that we consider switching costs as important as the se-
curity of our MTD application.
Choosing the correct value of α is not trivial and often dependent
on the specific web-application. For example, if a banking system
someday seeks to operate on a MTD system, we hope it puts more
weight on security than switching costs, selecting low α values. To
provide a sense to the reader, we later show in the experimental sec-
tion, how strategies and reward values are effected with changing
alpha values.
6. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
The goal of this section is to answer three key questions. Firstly,
does our proposed Bayesian Stackelberg Game (BSG) model gen-
erate better strategies that the state-of-the-art? Secondly, can we
effectively compute the set of critical vulnerabilities? Lastly, who
are the sensitive attacker types and how robust is our model?
6.1 Test Bed Description
PHP,
MySQL
Python,
MySQL
PHP, post-
greSQL
Python,
postgreSQL
PHP,
MySQL
0 2 6 10
Python,
MySQL
2 0 9 5
PHP, post-
greSQL
6 9 0 2
Python,
postgreSQL
10 5 2 0
Table 1: Swithing costs for our system
To answer the questions mentioned above, we develop a real
world MTD web application (shown in Figure 1) with 2 layers.
The key idea of applying MTD to web applications requires you to
have several versions of the same system, each written in either a
different language, using a different database, etc.
This diversity is not ubiquitous in legacy web applications, due
to cost, time, and resources required to build several versions of the
same web application. To aid this, we developed a framework to
automatically generate the diversity necessary for this web appli-
cation. The current prototype is able to convert a web application
coded in Python to an equivalent one coded in PHP, and vice versa,
as well as a web application using a MySQL database to an iden-
tical version that uses PostgreSQL, and vice versa. In the future,
as more and more variations are developed, the set of defender’s
actions will increase.
The present set of valid configurations for our system is C =
{(PHP, MySQL), (Python, MySQL), (PHP, postgreSQL), (Python,
postgreSQL )}. The costs for switching between configurations is
shown in Table 1. These cost values generated by our system ad-
ministrators are based on the following considerations:
• Switching between different languages while keeping the same
database dialect incurs minimal cost - workload is primarily
done is primarily on rerouting to the correct server with the
source language
• Switching between different database dialects while keeping
the same language incurs a slightly higher cost due to the
conversion required for the database structure and its con-
tents. One also has to account for copying large amounts of
data to the database used in the current system configuration.
• Switching between different database dialects AND different
languages incur the most cost due to the combination of the
costs of conversion for the database as well as the penalty for
rerouting to the correct server with the source language.
The attacker types along with the attack action set size are de-
fined in Table 2. We mined the NVD for obtaining CVE data from
January, 2013 to August, 2016 to generate these attack sets. If the
stakes of getting caught are too high for an attacker type given an
MTD system, he/she may choose not to attack. Hence, we have a
NO-OP action for each attacker type.
The optimization problems for the experiments were solved us-
ing Gurobi on an Intel Xeon E5 2643v3@3.40GHz machine with
6 cores and 64GB of RAM.
6.2 Strategy Evaluation
We evaluate our method using Bayesian Stackelberg Games on
our real life web application against the Uniform Random Strat-
egy (URS), which is the state-of-the-art in such systems [18]. We
plot the values of the objective function in Equation 2 for both the
Name (Technologies,
Expertise)
Prob. |Aθ2i |
Script Kiddie
(SK)
(PHP,4),
(MySQL,4)
0.15 34
Database
Hacker (DH)
(MySQL,10),
(postgreSQL,8)
0.35 269
Mainstream
Hacker (MH)
(Python,4),
(PHP,6),
(MySQL,5)
0.5 48
Table 2: Attacker types and attack action counts
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Figure 2: Objective function values for Uniform Random Strat-
egy Vs. Bayesian Stackelberg Game with switching costs as α
varies from 0 to 1.
strategies as α varies from 0 to 1. For URS, we use the exact val-
ues of wij = 0.25 ∗ 0.25 = 0.0625 ∀ i, j. The plot is shown in
Figure 2. Both are straight lines because although the value of α
changes, the strategy for URS is same (by definition) and the one
generated by BSG also remains the same. The latter case came as
a surprise to us initially. On further investigation, we noticed that
in the formulated game for our web-application, the Stackelberg
Equilibrium for our application (luckily) coincides with the least
switching cost strategy.
These attacker and defender strategies is shown in Table 3 along-
with the value of the defender’s reward (i.e. the first term in the ob-
jective function in Equation 2). Notice that, not only is the mixed
strategy generated by BSG more secure than URS, it leverages
fewer configurations than all valid configurations |C| = 4 the sys-
tem has to offer. This result is in unison with previous work in
cyber-security which show that having many configurations does
not necessary imply that all of them have to be used for providing
the best security [3].
6.2.1 Studying the effect of α-values
To empirically show that our solver is actually considering costs
of switching, we change the value for switching from (PHP, post-
greSQL ) to (Python, postgreSQL) and vice-versa from 2 (yel-
low boxes in Table 1) to 10. We plot this scenario in Figure 3. As
soon as α ≥ 0.4, the BSG generates (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25)
(which is URS) as the most optimal strategy. After analysis, we
note that this happens because the most powerful attack actions in
the arsenal of the attacker types are for the systems (PHP, MySQL)
and (Python, MySQL). When, one does not prioritize switching
costs (α ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3}), the system keeps switching between
the more secure configurations nullifying the good attacks of the
attackers. As switching costs start to get more significant (α ∈
{0.4, 0.5, . . . 1.2}), the objective function value reduces if it sticks
to the stronger configurations since switching costs are now high
for these. It switches to the URS in this case. Beyond that, it switches
Method Mixed Strategy Defender’s
Reward
Attack sets (SK,
DH, MH)
URS (0.25, 0.25, 0.25,
0.25)
-5 CVE-2016-3477,
CVE-2015-3144,
CVE-2016-3477
BSG (0, 0, 0.5, 0.5) -3.25 CVE-2014-0185,
CVE-2014-0067,
CVE-2014-0185
Table 3: Comparison between the strategies generated by Uni-
form Random Strategy (URS) Vs. Bayesian Stackelberg Game
(BSG)
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Figure 3: Top: Showcases the change in probabilities associated
with a particular configuration. Bottom: Objective function
values for Uniform Random Strategy Vs. Bayesian Stackelberg
Game with switching costs as α varies from 0 to 2.5 when the
cost of switching are as showcased in Table 1 with the values in
the yellow boxes being 10.
to the strategy (0.25, 0.5, 0, 0.25) as α keeps on increasing. When
α becomes close to 2, it completely ignores the security of the
system and tries to minimize the switching cost by proposing the
strategy (0.5, 0.5, 0, 0) as the cost for switching between (PHP,
MySQL) and (Python, MySQL) is the least (= 2).
In the bottom of Figure 3, we showcase the change in the val-
ues of objective function. At the start, the BSG generates a better
strategy when compared to URS. When the BSG strategy becomes
the same as the URS (for 0.4 ≤ α ≤ 1.2), we observe that the
objective function value for BSG is lower than URS. This is not
surprising since BSG is merely trying to estimate the value xi · xj
with the variables wij , whereas URS is using the exact value. As
we increase α further, we are essentially discouraging an MTD sys-
tem, since now the cost of switching has become so high, whereas
naive URS pays no heed to this.
6.3 Identifying Critical Vulnerabilities
In real-world development teams, it is impossible to solve all the
vulnerabilities, especially in a system with so many technologies.
In current software systems, given a set of vulnerabilities, a chal-
lenging question often asked is which vulnerabilities should one fix
k CV sets Objective
Value
CPU Time
1 {(CVE-2014-0185)} -2.435 3m15s
2 {(CVE-2014-0185,
CVE-2015-5652)}
-1.973 421m27s
Table 4: Most critical vulnerability in the MTD system and the
time required to generate it.
to improve the security?
For an MTD system, this becomes a tough problem since the de-
fender needs to reason about multiple attacker types– their proba-
bilities and attack actions. For a given k, the set of k vulnerabilities,
which on being fixed, result in the highest gain in defender strategy,
is termed as the k critical vulnerability set (k−CV).
To address this problem, we remove each k-sized attack set from
the set of all attacks (A′2 = A2 \ D ∀ D ⊂ A2 & |D| = k)
and evaluate the objective function (Equation 2). The sets A′2 that
yield the highest objective values, provide the vulnerabilitiesD that
should be fixed to improve the defender’s system.
We tried to study this complicated behaviour for some toy ex-
amples before applying it to our application. An interesting phe-
nomenon we noticed was that a k-set critical vulnerabilities (k−CV)
is not always a subset of the (k+1)−CV. Suppose we want to find
3 vulnerabilities that we want to fix. Since it is not just a super-set
of the 2-CV, we need to solve this problem from the scratch with
k = 3. Hence, there is going to be combinatorial explosion here. As
the value of k increases, we end up solving |A′2| =
(|A2|
k
)
MIQP
problems to identify the k−CVs.
6.3.1 Finding Critical Vulnerabilities in the Devel-
oped System
For our system, we start with k = 1, we increase number of criti-
cal vulnerabilities to be found by 1 at each step. The result remains
the same for α ∈ [0, 1] for our system. We do not play around
with α beyond this, mostly because this would be unrealistic for
any practical application. Unfortunately, the brute force approach
and the scalability of algorithms for solving normal extensive form
BSGs proves to be a key limitation.
This is not a surprise since the total number of unique CVEs
spread out among the attackers is 287. When k = 3, we end up
solving
(
287
3
)
optimization problems, which fails to scale in both
time and memory. Thus, we only show critical vulnerabilities iden-
tified up to k = 2 (in Table 4) using α = 0.2.
At present, we are trying to develop a single MIQP formulation
that tries to approximately generate the k-CV set. To reduce the
combinatorial explosion, we plan to use switch variables that can
turn attack actions on and off. This comes at the cost of increasing
the number of variables in the formulated optimization problem.
6.4 Model Robustness & Attacker
Type Sensitivity
It is often the case that a web application administrator (defender)
cannot accurately specify the probability for a particular attacker
type. In this section, we see how this uncertainty affects the op-
timal rewards generated by the system. We provide a notion for
determining sensitive attacker types and measuring the robustness
of a switching strategy.
For each attacker type i, we vary the probability Pθ2i by ±x%
(Pnewθ2i = Pθ2i(1 ± x100 )) where x is the sensitivity factor, which
can be varied from a low value to a high value as needed. Note that
now p = Pθ2i× x100 needs to be adjusted or distributed amongst the
probabilities of the remaining attacker types. To make sure that this
distribution is done such that the sensitivity of attacker i actually
stands out, we propose to distribute p amongst the other attacker
types using a weighted model as per their existing probabilities as
shown below. For attacker j ( 6= i), its new probability would be:
Pnewθ2j = Pθ2j (1∓ p∑
k(6=i)
Pθ2k
) (12)
When x% is subtracted from the probability ~Pθ2i , then the sign in
the above equation becomes positive, and vice-versa.
We now formally define the loss in reward to the defender as the
probability distribution over the attacker types change. Let Ro be
the overall reward for the defender when he uses the mixed strategy
for the assumed (and possibly incorrect) model of attacker type un-
certainty (~Pθ2 ) on the true model (~P
new
θ2
). LetRn be the defender’s
optimal reward value for the true model. We compute the Normal-
ized Loss in Rewards (NLR) for the defender’s strategy as follows:
NLR = Rn−Ro
Rn
(13)
Note that NLR values are ≥ 0. Higher values of NLR represent
more sensitive attacker types. Inaccurate probability estimates for
the sensitive attackers can be detrimental to the security of our
application. Note that lower NLR values indicate that a generated
strategy is more robust.
6.4.1 Evaluation Based on the Developed System
We compute the attacker sensitivity for our system varying the
probability of each attacker type from −100% to +100% (of its
modeled probability) with 10% step sizes. We plot the results in
Figure 4 using Equation 13. The Mainstream and Database hacker
(MH & DH) are the least sensitive attacker types. The NLR values
for both these attackers are 0. This is the case since the real world
attack action used by these types remain the same even when their
probabilities change. On the other hand, if the probability associ-
ated with the Script Kiddie (SK) is underestimated in our model,
we see that the strategies deviate substantially from the optimal.
For our experiments in this section, we use α = 0.2. The max
NLR for our BSG strategy is 2.35 Vs. 9 for URS. The average of
the 60 NLR values is 0.061 for BSG and 0.88 for URS. These val-
ues indicate our model is more robust to variance in attacker type
uncertainty than the present state-of-the-art.
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we propose a method to generate a switching strat-
egy for real-world web application based on the Moving Target De-
fense (MTD) architecture. To find an effective switching strategy,
we model the system as a repeated Bayesian game. We develop
methods to assign attack actions to attacker types and generate re-
alistic utilities based on expertise of security professionals. For ob-
taining real-world attack data, we mine vulnerabilities in the Na-
tional Vulnerability Database (NVD) and obtain utilities based on
the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). We formulate
an optimization problem which outputs a switching strategy that
maximizes system security while accounting for switching costs.
The generated strategy is shown to be more effective than the state-
of-the-art for a real-world application. We also provide metrics that
can be used to validate the robustness of switching strategies, ab-
sent in literature for multi-agent cyber-security systems. Lastly, we
propose the problem of identifying critical vulnerabilities and pro-
vide a solution.
The techniques in this paper are not limited to only web applica-
tions. The attack actions mined from the security databases relate to
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Figure 4: NLR values for BSG and URS genereated strategies
when attacker types probabilities vary in [−100%, 100%].
all kinds of technologies, like operating systems, coding languages
etc. Hence, the modelling should be relevant to any software appli-
cations using the MTD architecture. It would be interesting to see
how effective they are in such scenarios.
Investigating the reward structure for a particular problem has
helped design provably fast solvers in the physical security do-
mains. We believe this direction of research might help in develop-
ing faster solvers, alleviating the scalability problem of identifying
critical vulnerabilities, for the cyber-security domain as well.
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